For time:
1 Power clean 135#(95#)
1 Muscle up
3 Push ups
5 Air squats
2 Power cleans 135#(95#)
1 Muscle up
3 Push ups
5 Air squats
3 Power cleans 135#(95#)
1 Muscle up
3 Push ups
5 Air squats

Continue for 10 rounds adding a power clean to each round

Final round is:
10 Power cleans 135#(95#)
1 Muscle up
3 Push ups
5 Air squats

Post Results to BTWB. 

A BIG TOBACCO MOMENT FOR THE SUGAR INDUSTRY – By James Surowiecki

In May, 1994, a large FedEx box arrived at the office of Dr. Stanton Glantz, a public-health expert at the University of California, San Francisco, who specialized in tobacco research. Inside the box were four thousand pages of internal memoranda and correspondence dating back to the nineteen-fifties from the files of Brown & Williamson, which was then the third-largest tobacco company in the United States. The documents, which became known as the Cigarette Papers, showed that research funded by Brown & Williamson and the tobacco industry had demonstrated the addictive qualities of nicotine and the health hazards of smoking years before these things became public knowledge, and that tobacco companies had nonetheless embarked on a public campaign to deny what they knew to be true, from their own research, and to cast doubt on the dangers of cigarettes.

In contrast to the cloak-and-dagger manner in which the Cigarette Papers came to light, this week’s revelation that Big Sugar engaged in dubious machinations to hide the potential health effects of sugar consumption came about from slogging through document archives in libraries around the country. But the implications of that work, performed by Cristin Kearns, a postdoctoral fellow at U.C.S.F., and published this week in an article titled “Sugar Industry and Coronary Heart Disease Research,” in the American Medical Association’s journal of internal medicine, are similarly dismaying.

The documents Kearns uncovered show that the Sugar Association, in the early sixties, began a systematic effort to change public opinion “through our research and information and legislative programs,” with the goal of getting the public to consume more sugar and less fat. As part of that effort, John Hickson, a sugar-industry executive, funded research by Harvard scientists that was intended, explicitly, to exculpate sugar as a major risk factor for coronary heart disease and to cast blame instead on saturated fat. That research resulted in a 1967 article in the New England Journal of Medicine making that exact case. One of the scientists Hickson funded eventually became head of nutrition at the U.S. Department of Agriculture, where he helped author a draft of what would become the government’s first official nutritional guidelines—guidelines that recommended a low-fat diet.

It is true that there was no consensus in the sixties—and, indeed, there’s no real consensus today—about exactly how much the consumption of either sugar or saturated fat contributes to coronary heart disease (though most health authorities these days suggest both may be important). But the fact that the science of the time was uncertain doesn’t let the sugar industry off the hook for its influence-peddling, since what the Sugar Papers show is that the industry was essentially uninterested in science. Instead, it was interested in getting people to eat more sugar by painting sugar consumption as anodyne in its health effects and, just as important, by painting fat consumption as dangerous. As far back as 1954, the president of the Sugar Research Foundation, Harry Hass, gave a speech in which he explicitly said that the challenge for the “carbohydrate industries” was getting Americans to eat less fat, so that they could then eat more sugar. In that speech, Hass talked of teaching “people who had never had a course in biochemistry . . . that sugar is what keeps every human being alive and with energy to face our daily problems.” The sugar industry’s research and public-relations campaign—costing what would amount to some $5.3 million today—sought to make that happen. It was powerfully effective.

Of course, it’s possible the sugar industry both funded research that completely suited its interests and that it believed that the research was true. (In Hass’s 1954 speech, he concluded by saying that the consumption of more sugar, and less fat, would lead to a “tremendous improvement in general health.”) But Hickson didn’t commission the Harvard research in order to discover the truth about sugar and fat. He commissioned it in order to make fat look bad. And that’s what he got. It wasn’t unreasonable for the Harvard researchers to suggest that the link between sugar and coronary heart disease was unproved. But they discounted studies suggesting that reducing sugar consumption could help with coronary heart disease, while overstating the evidence blaming saturated fats.

Ironically, the Sugar Papers were made public the same week that Lamar Smith, the chairman of the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, has been holding hearings on Exxon’s suppression of its own research into climate change. Actually, to be more accurate, Smith is holding hearings in an attempt to quash further investigations into what Exxon did. After a big exposé in InsideClimate News, last fall, showed that Exxon’s scientists knew for decades that there was a connection between fossil-fuel consumption and climate change, and that the company hid that research, a number of state attorneys general opened investigations into the possibility that Exxon’s public denials of the science of global warming had, in effect, misled and defrauded investors. Smith, a climate-change denier and water-carrier for Big Energy, has painted those investigations as political attacks on Exxon’s First Amendment rights (even though the First Amendment does not protect knowingly false statements). The Big Sugar revelations make Smith’s charges look even feebler than before, serving as a reminder of how willing big companies are to suppress inconvenient information in the pursuit of their economic interests.